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By means of panel and time series regression analyses, and by resorting to a variance decomposition due to Asdrubali et 
al. (1996) we show that income flows to and from abroad did not play, in general, a large risk sharing role for a pool of 
EU countries over the horizon 1976-2007. This is particularly true in a pre-globalization period, but remains true for 
some countries, even in the finance globalization era. We then extend the analysis to consider a measure of cash flow, 
instead of income, available for consumption, and observe that capital flows to and from abroad have played a largely 
destabilizing role, to an extent that one might have not expected beforehand. Key to this result is also the study of 
asymmetries in smoothing positive and negative shocks by the different possible channels. These findings seem to 
provide some useful insights onto the origin of the recent global financial crisis. 
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The empirical literature is strongly divided over the effects of financial integration on international 
risk sharing.  
Some  authors  claim  that,  thanks  to  financial  globalization,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  risk 
sharing, starting from the early 1990s. Others claim that data do not reveal a link between financial 
globalization and increased risk sharing, and suggest a threshold mechanism: improved financial 
integration would not guarantee, per se, a rise in the degree of risk sharing or the presence of risk 
pooling. When financial markets integration steps up, agents can access a wider range of viable 
insurance opportunities. However, capital flows should be sufficiently large to produce a tangible 
effect on risk sharing. In other words, levels matter: increased financial integration, if below a 
certain level, is not enough to produce a higher degree of risk sharing or a shift from a situation of 
absence of risk sharing to a more favourable one of partial pooling of risk among countries. 
Recently, Sørensen et al. (2007) purport to provide the missing link between the risk sharing and 
home bias literature. An earlier attempt to compare the two approaches was made by Lewis (1999). 
The home bias puzzle and the quantity puzzle may be two sides of the same coin: agents who 
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diversify  their  portfolios  internationally  are  more  likely  to  smooth  income  and  consumption. 
Sørensen et al. (2007) find that home bias decreases while risk sharing increases during the 1990s. 
They measure risk sharing as the “distance” of consumption growth from a situation of perfect 
markets (perfect consumption risk sharing), and provide a measure of income smoothing. Both 
these measures show improvements, which would hint at a robust and positive correlation between 
level of foreign portfolio assets and income risk sharing, and between foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and consumption risk sharing. 
Giannone and Reichlin (2006), in quite a similar fashion, register an increase in risk sharing among 
European countries from the early 1990s when market integration significantly accelerated. They 
also warn, however, that estimates on selected subsamples may be affected by the subsample choice 
itself.  
Along  these  lines,  but  with  quite  different  results,  Bai  and  Zhang  (2005)  conduct  a  regression 
analysis similar to that of Mace (1991) (both panel and cross section) dividing the sample (1973-
1998) in two sub-samples (1973-1985; 1986-1998) and conducting separate tests for 19 developed 
countries, for 21 developing countries and for the whole group. Their study shows that, although the 
degree  of  financial  integration  doubles  from  the  first  to  the  second  sub-period,  there  is  no 
substantial improvement in international risk sharing. Moreover, they find that the share of nations 
in default also increased greatly over time, and conclude that even if the costs of borrowing are 
lowered and financial integration has increased, given the magnitude of capital flows, international 
risk sharing is not sensitive to this increase in financial integration. To get an improvement in 
international risk sharing, greater financial integration is not enough per se, but capital flows among 
countries need to be very large. 
Kose et al. (2009) find very weak links between financial globalization and risk sharing, over the 
period  1960-2004,  and  for  the  two  subsamples  1960-2004  (pre-globalization)  and  1987-2004 
(globalization). In particular, they find that if globalization does not seem to have exerted any 
significant impact on risk sharing for the whole sample of countries and the whole period, it has 
played  a  negative  impact  on  risk  sharing  for  emerging  economies.  However,  on  the  shorter 
globalization sample, only developed countries seem to have reaped some benefits from financial 
globalization in terms of risk sharing, whereas the subset of emerging economies does not seem to 
have  been  affected,  at  least  in  a  statistically  significant  way.  This  might  also  be  due  to  the 
composition of capital flows, with portfolio debts playing a somewhat destabilizing role. On the 
other hand, Kose et al. (2006) noticed that “financial openness, as measured by gross capital flows 
as a ratio to GDP, is associated with an increase in the ratio of consumption volatility to income 
volatility,  contrary  to  the  notions  of  improved  international  risk-sharing  opportunities  through 
financial integration.”   6 
Kaminsky et al. (2005) investigate over the relationship of net capital inflows and GDP, and find 
that net capital flows are procyclical in most OECD and developing countries, i.e. countries tend to 
borrow in good times and repay in bad times.  They also show that this is particularly so for middle-
high income economies, for which credit ratings vary from good to bad times. 
Artis and Hoffmann (2006) impute the failure to detect improvements in risk sharing to the type of 
data used in standard test regressions. They argue that log-differenced data stress high frequencies, 
strengthening  the  business  cycle  link  between  consumption  and  output  volatility.  Thus,  they 
propose using log-level data to exploit their implicit information and claim to be able to document 
an increasing percentage of risk shared during the 1990s. Improvements in international risk sharing 
would therefore be recognizable only on a long run horizon, and risk sharing would be a long term 
phenomenon.  
Artis and Hoffmann (2008) and Becker and Hoffmann (2006) draw attention to the question of 
permanent and transitory shocks. Becker and Hoffmann (2006) point to the distinction between ex 
ante and ex post channels of smoothing claiming that consumption cannot be smoothed ex post if 
the economy is hit by permanent shocks since they require a more sophisticated market structure. 
Their analysis, based on a VAR cointegration approach on industrialized countries and US states, 
provided results that can be summarized as follows: with US data one half of the idiosyncratic risk 
is shared ex ante, while with international data ex ante risk sharing is virtually absent. The amount 
of risk shared ex post, on the other hand, is similar with US and international data, but lack of 
insurance worsens over a longer time span. Moreover, they find that lack of insurance seems to be 
due predominantly to failure of insurance against permanent shocks while transitory shocks are 
almost completely shared. 
Artis and Hoffmann (2008) argue that the increase in risk sharing has been affected by the decline 
in output growth volatility in most industrialized countries starting from the early 1980s, with the 
volatility of transitory shocks decreasing relatively more than the volatility of permanent shocks. 
Given that consumption reacts mainly to permanent shocks, it would appear more volatile with 
respect to current changes in output. For this reason, at business cycle frequencies, standard tests of 
consumption insurance would fail to reveal improvements in risk sharing.  
Leibrecht and Scharler (2008) explore the cointegration properties of the model’s variables applying 
a standard two step Engle and Granger (1987) procedure in a panel cointegration approach, for a 
sample of 21 OECD countries. Their findings seem to confirm the hypothesis that lack risk sharing 
is a long-term phenomenon. Thirty percent of risk is shared in the short run whereas only 10 percent 
is insured in the long run. They impute this outcome partly to credit market constraints (in line with 
the previous literature), which become more severe over longer time horizons, and argue that the 
delay  involved  in  consumption  responding  to  income  shocks  depends  on  the  degree  of   7 
diversification (thus on the degree of financial integration). In fact they realize that countries, whose 
foreign  asset  and  liability  position  is  below  the  average,  experience  a  shorter  mean  lag  of 
adjustment, meaning that consumption reacts more rapidly to income shocks, while countries that 
are characterized by above average foreign assets and liability positions have a much higher mean 
lag of adjustment. 
This  work  will  bring  fuel  to  the  negative  view  on  financial  globalization  and  risk  sharing,  by 
showing that not only foreign income flows have had a very small, if at all significant, role in 
smoothing  consumption  dynamics,  but  that  also  financial  (capital)  flows  had  a  largely  dis-
smoothing effect onto the disposable cash flow available for consumption. 
To do so, we will resort to a decomposition of the variability of GDP, which will be augmented to 
account for international financial flows, to be considered both in their entirety, and in their sub 
components, as was the case in Kose et al. (2007). This is the focus of section 3, providing a 
framework  for  the  ensuing  empirical  analysis.  Before  that,  section  2  recalls  the  variance 
decomposition of Asdrubali et al. (1996). Section 4 is dedicated to the description of data. Results 
of the empirical analysis are summarized in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Channels of international risk sharing 
 
The seminal paper by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) opened a new line of research: the study of 
channels through which risk sharing takes place and the measurement of its extent.  
Asdrubali et al. (1996) (hereafter ASY) published an influential paper that constitutes a turning 
point within the regression-based approach to international risk sharing, for several reasons. First 
and foremost, applying a simple decomposition of cross-sectional variance in gross state product 
they not only quantify the amount of risk sharing, but also identify “levels of smoothing”: channels 
through which shocks to gross state product are smoothed (capital markets, federal government and 
credit markets). They also decompose federal government smoothing into: taxes, transfers, and 
federal grants to states. This constitutes a step forward from Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) which 
only examines the amount of insurance (against regional income shocks) brought by the federal 
fiscal  system.  Second,  they  change  the  focus  from  testing  for  full  insurance  to  a  more 
comprehensive analysis that tests for the presence of full risk sharing (as in previous work), but also 
gauges the extent of risk shared through each channel, providing some crucial insights for economic 
policy. Finally, their work provides seeds for vital developments on the topic, such as the role of 
shock persistence on risk sharing (subsequently developed, for example, by Becker and Hoffmann, 
2006; Artis and Hoffmann, 2008) and the study of the long run properties of the model variables 
(further developed by Artis and Hoffmann, 2006; Leibrecht and Scharler, 2008). 
Summing up, channels of risk sharing are identified by ASY as follows:   8 
1.  cross-ownership of productive assets (capital markets channel); 
2.  central government tax-transfer system as a vehicle for further income smoothing (federal 
government channel); 
3.  consumption smoothing through “lending” and “borrowing”(credit market channel). 
It is quite evident that the first two channels can be rather referred to as “income smoothing”, as 
they intervene in the process of income generation, whereas saving could be more properly defined 
as “consumption smoothing”, which is a way to spread consumption more evenly across date-even 
pairs, once income is given (Morduch, 1995). 
Let us denote by Gsp the gross state product, by si the state income (inclusive of dividends, interest 
and rental income payments across state borders), by dsi the disposable state income (including 
federal taxes and transfers) and by c consumption. If full risk sharing is achieved, the dynamics of 
consumption  should  not  depend  on  those  of  gsp  for  a  given  level  of  aggregate  output.  To 
decompose the period by period cross sectional variance in gross state product we can then start 















i                       (1) 
where i is the index for the state. 
If  shocks  are  smoothed  through  the  channels  just  mentioned,  then  an  increase  in  gsp  should 
correspond  to  a  smaller  increase  in  si,  and  an  even  smaller  positive  variation  in  dsi,  and 
consumption should not co-vary with gsp at all. 
Taking the log-difference of equation (1), multiplying both sides by  "log(gspi) (minus its mean) 




i { } = cov "loggsp
i,"loggsp
i # "logsi
i { }                 (2) 
      +cov "loggsp
i,"logsi
i # "logdsi
i { } 
      +cov "loggsp
i,"logdsi
i # "logc
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            +cov "loggsp
i,"logc
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Dividing  by  var "loggsp { }  we  obtain  that  1  =  !k  +!f  +!c  +!u,  where  !k  (for  instance)  is  the 
ordinary least square estimates of regressing  "loggsp # "logsi on  "loggsp and a constant. In 
practice, those coefficients are obtained by running the following panel regressions: 
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"loggspt
i # "logsit
i =$k,t + %k"loggspt
i + uk,t
i                           (3) 
"logsit
i # "logdsit
i =$ f ,t + %f"loggspt
i + uf ,t
i                           (4) 
"logdsit
i # "logct
i =$c,t + %c"loggspt
i + uc,t
i                                       (5) 
"logct
i =#u,t + $u"loggspt
i + uu,t
i                               (6) 
 
where   is time fixed effects to include the mean. Coefficients !k, !f and !c are interpreted as the 
percentage of smoothing achieved at capital markets, federal government and credit market levels, 
while !u represents the portion of unsmoothed risk. In fact, expressions (3) to (6) include both 
income  and  consumption  smoothing.  Income  smoothing  is  concerned  in  (3)  to  (5),  whereas 
consumption smoothing is expressed by (6). 
If the hypothesis of full risk sharing is accepted !u should equal zero and !k, !f and !c should sum to 
1. ASY find that 39 percent of shocks to gross state product are smoothed via capital markets, 13 
percent through federal government, 23 percent via credit markets and the remaining 25 percent is 
not smoothed (between 1963 and 1990 among U.S. Federal States). The percentage of smoothing 
due to federal government is further decomposed, as 10.6 percent is imputable to the direct tax 
transfer system and an additional 2.5 percent to federal grants to states. ASY stress a distinction 
between smoothing via capital markets and by credit markets channels since the first is the result of 
ex ante arrangements, while the second takes place after the shock has occurred (ex post). Capital 
markets would therefore be able to insure against permanent as well as transitory shocks, whereas 
credit markets would not be able to cope with permanent shocks. In addition, the authors claim that 
credit market smoothing drops when the time distance between consecutive observations increases, 
due to credit constraints which might become more severe over longer time horizons. This point, 
outlined in ASY, is further explored in later works by Artis and Hoffmann (2006; 2008) and Becker 
and Hoffmann (2006).  
Sørensen  and  Yosha  (1998)  (SY  hereafter),  applying  the  methodology  developed  in  ASY, 
investigate  the  paths  of  risk  sharing  among  European  Community  (EC)  and  OECD  countries. 
Similarly to Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), they take the US as a benchmark of a successful 
monetary union in order to gauge the EMU which, at the time, was entering the third and last phase 
of the monetary unification process (1st January 1999). Instruments to insure against shocks to 
output are essential to the stability of a monetary union; the US experience demonstrates that 62 
percent of shocks to the gross per capita product of individual states were smoothed via transactions 
on markets (capital and credit markets) and only 25 percent of risk was not smoothed. The results 
for the EC and OECD countries turned out to be strikingly different. First, capital markets are much 
less integrated compared to the US case. Second, uninsured risk between 1966 and 1980 amounts to   10 
57 percent for the EC
1 and 66 percent for OECD countries. For both groups of countries the largest 
fraction of risk sharing is achieved through savings (46 and 40 percent respectively). Consumption 
smoothing  via  subcomponents  of  national  savings  during  the  1980s,  in  the  OECD  (44  percent 
overall) is due to corporate savings and government savings (around 20-25 percent each). These 
dissimilarities with the U.S. point at the different structures of the corresponding economic systems.  
More recently, Balli and Sørensen (2006) try to provide preliminary (due to the short time lag from 
the introduction of the Euro currency) results on the effect of the monetary union in term of income 
and consumption smoothing. They repeat the exercise conducted in SY for the EMU and EU and 
claim that in the period 1999-2003 two things changed: first, the capital markets channel smoothes 
up to 11 percent of risk for the EMU and up to 6 percent for the EU, whereas the portion of risk 
sharing  due  to  national  saving  decreased  sharply.  They  detect  that  before  1999  factor  income 
smoothing was close to zero (as in SY) and rose steeply just after 1999. Although the samples used 
to evaluate the impact of the EMU are still too small to draw clear cut conclusions, at first sight it 
seems that the relevance of the factor income channel has considerably increased, and that the EMU 
is on a path converging to the U.S. situation. The same conclusion is reached in Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al. (2004), who find that industrial specialization has increased over the last decade, leading to the 
conjecture that “risk sharing plays an important causal effect by allowing countries to specialize 
without being subject to higher income risk even though the variability of output may increase”. 
Moreover, they claim that the decline in the asymmetries of GDP fluctuations in the EU signals 
economic policies becoming more similar (for example, all member states are required to fulfil the 
Maastricht criteria).  
As anticipated in the introduction, we will depart from the ASY paradigm in several important 
directions.  
 
3. A cash flow approach to channels of smoothing 
 
With respect to the framework outlined in section 2, our analysis will be based upon a notion of 
disposable cash flow, instead of one of disposable income. 
To get a measure of disposable cash flow we realize that, in the aggregate, new domestic debts and 
credits  possibly  intervening  in  the  process  of  GDP  generation  cancel  out,  so  that  domestic 
disposable income is also equal to domestic cash flow. 
To obtain total cash flow we add the (yearly) change in net foreign position. Total cash flow will be 
greater than domestic cash flow if net indebtedness towards other countries has increased, or if 
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foreign assets owned have decreased (i.e. new loans from abroad have been obtained or capitals 
have been repatriated). On the other hand, total cash flow goes below domestic cash flow if net 
foreign indebtedness goes down or new investments in foreign assets are carried out. Capital flows 
to and from abroad will also be split into several components, as will be made clear in the next 
section. 

























" DNCF3#(NS + FA) (7)
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where the involved quantities are related as follows:  
GDP 
+ Net Factor Income 
= GNI 
– Capital Depreciation 
= NI (Net National Income) 
+ Net International Transfers 
= DNI (Disposable National Income) 
+ (Net) direct investments 
= DNCF1 
+ (Net) other investments 
= DNCF2 
+ (Net) portfolio investments and financial derivatives 
= DNCF3 
– NS + (Net) Financial Account (FA) 
= Consumption (C+G) 
 
We further decompose Net Saving (NS) into Government Saving (GS) and Private Saving (PS). 
By applying additional manipulations, as in (2), we obtain: 
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By dividing both sides of (8) by var "logGDP
i { }, as in (2), we obtain:  
 














i and reveals the percentage of smoothing achieved by factor 
income channel (flows of income from the rest of the world). Analogously,  "d,"#,"di,"oi,"pf,"gs,"ps 
give  percentages  of  smoothing  via  depreciation  of  capital,  transfers,  direct  investments, 
international bank loans, portfolio investments, government saving and private saving. "u is what is 
left  after  income  and  consumption  smoothing  took  place  and  represents  relative  consumption 
growth rate reactions to relative GDP rate of growth, therefore quantifying the unsmoothed part of 
idiosyncratic shocks to income.  
It  is  important  to  get  some  intuition  as  to  the  meaning  of  those  regression  coefficients.  All 
coefficients but the last one,  "u, can also be thought of as the difference between the estimated 
coefficients in two distinct regressions. For example, "oi is the difference between the coefficient of 
the  regression  of  "logDNCF2
i  over  GDP  growth,  "logGDP
i,  measuring  the  co-movement 
between GDP growth and the growth in the second cash flow aggregate, and the coefficient of the 
regression of the cash flow aggregate  "logDNCF1
i over GDP growth (again, measuring the co-
movement between GDP growth and the growth in the first cash flow aggregate). In simpler words, 
this difference measures the differential smoothing in GDP growth induced by eliminating the item 
“other investments” from the previous aggregate.  
In  order  to  correctly  interpret  the  signs  of  the  regression  coefficients,  it  is  also  important  to 
distinguish among the items representing sources and uses of cash, generating or exhausting cash 
flows, and the fact of subtracting or adding that specific item to the previous aggregate. 
For example, in going from DNI to DNCF3 we are adding cash flow sources. This means that if the 
associated regression coefficients’ estimates are negative, the contribution of the corresponding 
variables will be a dis-smoothing one (that is, by adding a source of cash flow we are getting a new 
aggregate which is more volatile than the previous one). On the other hand, in passing from GDP to   13 
disposable national income we add sources of funds (except for the case of depreciation), and a 
positive coefficient will signal a smoothing role played by the corresponding aggregate. On the 
other hand, to get from total cash flow (DNCF3) to total savings we are subtracting consumption, 
which represents a use of funds. A positive estimated coefficient will reveal, consistently with our 
interpretation, a smoothing role for saving. 
The  second  fundamental  departure  from  the  ASY  methodology  consists  in  allowing  for 
asymmetries in the functioning of smoothing channels. In other words, we allow for a different 
working of the various channels in response to a negative or a positive shock. There are several 
reasons why the response of smoothing channels might be different depending on the sign of the 
shock, such as non linearity, non stationarity of the involved variables, etc. 
To  distinguish  between  positive  and  negative  realizations  of  the  variable  "log(GDPit),  we  are 
going to use a concept of output gap, as follows. Assuming that the trend output (as measured, for 
example, by real GDP filtered according to the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) method) is the level of 
output  that  a  country  wishes  to  secure,  we  define  as  “negative”  components  of  the  variable 
"log(GDPit) those corresponding to periods of negative output gap (when actual GDP is below its 
trend level), and “positive” components those corresponding to periods of positive output gap. This, 
let us notice, does not imply that those components be actually negative or positive, as the opposite 
might be the case.  
This method will allow us to capture unfavourable and favourable shocks even when  "log(GDPit) 
is positive at all times, which is almost always the case for developed countries and for many 
developing countries, as well.  
For a robustness check, we will identify negative and positive components of innovations to GDP 
by using alternative filters, namely a HP filter, a band pass filter à la Baxter and King (1999), and a 
linear and/or quadratic trend. 
The final estimated equations will therefore contain on the right hand side, besides a constant term, 
the variables  "logGDPt
i+ and  "logGDPt
i#, respectively containing positive and negative shocks, 
and zeros. 
Last but not least, we will depart from the ASY model by also proposing a time-series counterpart 
of (8), as we suspect that panel estimations may conceal a remarkable variety of behaviours of the 
various smoothing channels across countries. That this is more than a conjecture will become clear 
from the empirical evidence presented in the next section. 
To construct a time series version of system (8) we need to obtain an exact decomposition of the 
time  series  variance  of  the  variable  "logGDPt
i  (or  its  dichotomous  counterpart,  if  shocks  are 
divided between positive and negative). However, we also need to express consumption and GDP 
and its components in relative terms, i.e. as deviations from cross sectional averages. Therefore, for   14 
time series analyses the procedure has been the following: 1) compute the cross sectional averages 
of all variables in (8) (i.e., in delta logs); 2) express all variables as deviations from cross sectional 
averages (which is equivalent to the inclusion of time fixed effects in the panel counterpart); 3) 
compute variances and co-variances of the model’s variables with respect to the time dimension. 
This way, for each country a system like (8) can be estimated, yielding estimated coefficients which 
represent the smoothing power of each channel over time. 
 
4. Data  
 
Our sample is constituted of members of the European Union joining in by the 1
st of January 1995, 
with the exclusion of Luxembourg and Belgium due to lack of data on financial account. Therefore, 
13 countries have been considered: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Our time horizon goes from 
1976 to 2007. National accounts data have been collected from OECD National Accounts Volume 
II - Detailed Tables - Main Aggregates Vol. 2009 release 01, while data on government saving are 
from  WEO  (World  Economic  Outlook),  and  Financial  Account  data  come  from  International 
Monetary Fund (BOPS database). Real values have been obtained using final consumption deflator 
and the base year is 2000. All variables are taken in per capita terms. 
In the BOP (Balance of Payments), the Financial Account records all international transactions 
which determine a change in ownership of financial assets and liabilities and include the creation 
and  liquidation  of  financial  claims.  It  is  given  by  the  sum  of  four  categories:  (net)  direct 
investments, (net) portfolio investments, (net) other investments and (net) financial derivatives. All 
components of the financial account are divided directionally in two sections: foreigners investing 
in  reporting  economy  and  residents  investing  abroad.  In  general  terms  a  transaction  which 
determines an inflow of funds is recorded with a positive sign, conversely an outflow of funds is 
recorded with a negative sign. For the first two categories (direct and portfolio investments), assets 
are  given  by  residents  buying  or  selling  an  ownership  stake  in  foreign  businesses  (or  foreign 
securities in the case of portfolio investments), while liabilities record foreigners buying (or selling) 
ownership stake in businesses in the reporting economy. According to the IMF’s criteria an investor 
defined as “portfolio investor” owns less than ten percent of a business. Owners of more than ten 
percent of a business may have a significant role in the management and are treated as “direct 
investors”.  The  financial  derivatives  category  is  given  by  financial  instruments  which  allow 
investors  to  trade  specific  financial  risks  through  financial  markets.  The  last  category  (other 
investments), which is probably the most relevant for our analysis, is mainly composed of bank 
loans, specifically principal loans, given that interests are covered by factor income in the current 
account  section  of  the  BOP.  In  addition  to  bank  loans,  this  category  registers  all  financial   15 
transactions not included in the other categories composing the financial account. Issues of bank 
loans to foreigners by a domestic bank (negative sign) and repayments of the principal on the loan 
to domestic banks by foreigner (positive sign) are recorded in the assets sheet while actions taken 
by residents with foreign banks are recorded in the liabilities sheet. Bank loans are of particular 
interest since they can play a relevant role of consumption smoothing. They may represent a flow of 
funds on which agents can rely to cope with idiosyncratic shocks to domestic GDP. On the other 
hand, this channel may also amplify and transmit shocks to other countries.  
 
5. Estimation results 
 
The  following  panel  equations  have  been  estimated  as  a  system,  with  two  stage  least  squares 
accounting for heteroskedasticity (dividing variables for the standard deviation of the rate of growth 




i =$k,t + %k"logGDPt
i + uk,t
i             
"logGNIt
i # "logNIt
i =$d,t + %d"logGDPt
i + uf ,t
i              
"logNIt
i # "logDNIt
i =$c,t + %&"logGDPt
i + u&,t
i              
"logDNIt
i # "logDNCF1t
i =$di,t + %di"logGDPt
i + udi,t
i              
"logDNCF1t
i # "logDNCF2t
i =$oi,t + %oi"logGDPt
i + uoi,t
i                 
"logDNCF2t
i # "logDNCF3t
i =$pf ,t + %pf"logGDPt
i + upf ,t
i            
"logDNCF3t





i       
"log DNCF3# PS + FA ( ) [ ]
t
i





i   





i                                            (9)
           
where  ".,t  represents  time  fixed  effects  which  allow  accounting  for  common  shocks  to  output 
(systemic risk). 
 
5.1. Risk sharing through national accounts categories 
In this section, for comparative purposes, we analyse results obtained by carrying out the same 
empirical exercise as in SY and Balli and Sørensen (2006). This will enable us to evaluate the 
percentage of risk smoothed by each category of the national accounts, with particular attention to 
pre and post European Monetary Union (EMU) sub-periods. In table 1 are reported percentages of 
income and consumption smoothing by National Accounts categories on the whole sample of data 
(13 EU countries from 1976 to 2007). Column one contains results in line with those presented in   16 
earlier contributions (cited in section 2): factor income seems to play no role, capital depreciation 
displays a dis-smoothing behaviour, being procyclical with respect to idiosyncratic income shocks. 
Most of smoothing is given by saving (31 percent) and in particular by government saving (23 
percent) since private saving would amount to a non statistically significant 8 percent. The overall 
degree of consumption smoothing is equal to 29 percent. Once asymmetric shocks to income are 
taken into account, and considering responses to negative shocks, results are pretty much consistent 
with the standard case. However, a closer look at responses to negative shocks, applying a linear 
and/or quadratic trend (column (4) in table 1), reveals something interesting. Factor income turns 
out to exert a negative effect, signalling a possible outflows of income (or a decrease of inflows 
from abroad) when the economy faces negative shocks. The impact of private saving hovers around 
17 percent, attributing a relevant smoothing role to households and to no profit institutions serving 
households.  Table  2  contains  results  for  the  subsamples  1976-1998  (pre-EMU)  and  1999-2007 
(post-EMU), providing us with useful information about possible (and expected) changes in the 
level of smoothing after the introduction of the Euro currency, which marked the beginning of the 
third  phase  of  the  monetary  unification  process  and  a  substantive  improvement  in  European 
integration. Between 1976 and 1998 (column (1) in table 2), levels of smoothing are very close in 
magnitude  to  results  on  the  whole  sample.  On  the  contrary,  between  1999  and  2007  some 
remarkable  changes  occurred.  Even  though  the  overall  degree  of  risk  sharing  shows  a  slight 
decrease (3 percent), the relative relevance of channels of income smoothing is radically different. 
In particular, if before 1998 the predominant source of smoothing was saving, while factor income 
was in fact irrelevant, from 1999 most income shocks are absorbed by net factor income from 
abroad  (10  percent),  possibly  as  a  consequence  of  the  increase  in  financial  integration  among 
member states. Saving not only loses its leading role (with a meager 7 percent) but also does seem 
to be useless (or even counterproductive) in the face of negative shocks to GDP, showing a negative 
sign on  "gs and/or  "ps under most filters (both government and private saving when HP filter is 
used, government saving applying BK filter and private saving when a linear and/or quadratic trend 
is used). Capital depreciation is not statistically significant but it switches from a negative to a 
positive sign showing a change in its role. 
So  far  we  broadly  confirmed  the  results  obtained  in  the  literature,  with  the  additional  insights 
coming from the decomposition of shocks. We may now turn to the analysis of the role of cash 
flows coming from, and going to, other countries.  
 
          [insert table 1 and 2 here] 
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5.2.  Channels  of  income  and  consumption  smoothing  through  national  accounts  and  financial 
account categories 
Table 3 shows the percentage of smoothing achieved through the usual channels to which we now 
add the one working through the financial account channel (and its subcomponents). The first three 
channels and the unsmoothed part of shocks remain unchanged with respect to the standard case, 
since no modification has been made in the corresponding equations, while saving is affected by the 
inclusion of flows of funds coming from international transactions, as these flows have an impact 
on the agents’ total liquidity.  
What we observe is an essentially dis-smoothing role played by the financial channel, of around 17 
percent, mostly attributable to the bank loans (“other investments”) subcomponent (column (1) 
table 3). Here, most consumption smoothing occurs at the saving (mainly government saving) level. 
 
          [insert table 3 here] 
 
Table 4 contains results for the two sub-periods. We can notice that between 1976 and 1998 the 
item “other investments” (essentially, bank loans) displays a coefficient equal to -0.25 which is 
primarily accounted for by reactions to positive shocks, implying a positive rate of growth of net 
flow of funds in the face of positive GDP shocks. With respect to negative shocks the estimated 
coefficient remains negative, but small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. In other words, 
the  rate  of  growth  of  international  bank  loans  correlates  positively  with  the  rate  of  growth  of 
income. This channel seems to be working as follows: when domestic economy faces a positive 
shock there is an inflow of funds (a rise in bank loans) and consequently an increase in liquidity, 
whereas in case of negative shocks a contraction of liquidity comes about. As a consequence of this, 
we  observe  a  larger  role  of  saving,  acting  to  compensate  this  dis-smoothing  behaviour  of 
international bank loans reaching a value of about 49 percent in the pre-EMU sub-period. Once we 
look at the post-EMU sub-period (1999-2007) the situation changes: as previously noted, saving 
loses  its  dominant  role, the financial  account  channel  amounts  to  a  lower  (not  significant)  -10 
percent, but the banking channel’s coefficient moves from a significant -25 percent (between 1976 
and 1998) to a not significant -4 percent (during EMU era), portfolio investments drop from 3 
percent to -31 percent, while direct investments rise from zero to 25 percent (even though still not 
significant).  
Looking at the sign of the latter, we realize that its contribution is, maybe expectedly, counter-
cyclical: when the economy grows, capitals flow out to cover investments abroad, while when the 
economy suffers, less capital flows out, and more foreign capitals flow in. In this sense, FDI flows 
play a smoothing role, especially in the second sub-period.   18 
 
          [insert table 4 here] 
 
In  our  analyses,  we  argue  in  terms  of  liquidity  rather  than  income,  and  our  objective  is  to 
understand if international capital flows (to and from abroad), which increase or decrease agents’ 
liquidity,  have  a  role  in  stabilizing  economic  fluctuations.  Our  main  research  question, 
consequently, is: in the face of a negative shock, what is the behaviour of direct investments, bank 
loans and portfolio investments? Are they procyclical? Are they countercyclical? Could they help 
offsetting idiosyncratic shocks? And to what extent? As increased financial integration implied an 
increase in the volume of these international capital flows
3 (see Lane and Milesi Ferretti, 2007), we 
try to understand their impact on domestic economies. Thus, in addition to standard channels -
within our “cash flow” approach- we explore the impact-on domestic economic fluctuations- of (for 
instance) foreign saving. The current literature focused on the net factor income channel
4 (which 
includes, among other items, net dividends on FDI and net interests on bank loans) and claim for an 
increase in the smoothing role of this channel over the globalization era as the theory would predict 
(e.g.,  Balli  and  Sørensen,  2006).  We  want  to  focus  the  attention  on  those  flows,  which  partly 
generate  the  net  factor  income.  Our  empirical  analysis  does  show  that  these  flows  might  be 
destabilizing, so that the counterpart of an increased risk sharing through factor income is a di-
smoothing (destabilizing) effect, due to the cash flows generating the net factor income itself. Over 
the period 1999-2007 the financial channel turns out to be not statistically significant, which may 
hint at an increased amount of risk sharing. Nevertheless, results on the second subsample (1999-
2007), as a consequence of the limited number of years since the start of the EMU, do not allow to 
draw clear-cut conclusions. Given the time horizon considered we might conclude in favour of an 
improvement  in  risk  sharing  with  respect  to  first  subsample.  However,  since  the  variance 
decomposition holds by construction, we can probably trust the sign of the estimated coefficient 
attached to the financial channel (regardless of its statistical significance), which remains negative.  
Table 5 contains results for each single country, applying the time series decomposition of variance 
presented in the previous section. The time series version of system (8) is one of the novelties of 
this work, although we are aware of its limitations due to the restricted number of observations 
available for estimation. The main scope of this analysis is to complement the panel analysis, which 
relies on a larger sample, but disregards the countries’ heterogeneity (in the estimates of slopes). 
Panel estimates quantify the percentage of average smoothing through the various channels, relative 
to the pool of countries considered (this is a standard empirical strategy in this stream of literature), 
                                                 
3 Figure A1 in appendix reports plots for financial account components to GDP ratio and it can be easily recognized the 
remarkable growth of net international capital flows over the globalization era. 
4 Recently, there is a growing interest on capital gains as further channel of smoothing compared to income flows (see, 
for instance, Balli, Kalemli-Ozcan and Sørensen, 2010; Bracke and Schmitz, 2010; Schmitz, 2010)   19 
while time series estimates allow to quantify channels of smoothing country by country highlighting 
differences in countries’ levels of smoothing, which may remain completely hidden in the panel 
analysis.  
At a country level, factor income has a significant and negative role for Finland, Portugal and 
Sweden, while it constitutes the main source of smoothing for Ireland, amounting to an impressive 
18 percent. That this channel may have not worked at all during the last crisis might account for its 
particularly severe blow upon the Irish economy. International transfers are particularly relevant for 
Germany, Portugal and Great Britain (24, 15 and 10 percent respectively). Except for Austria, the 
Netherlands and Sweden, the financial account’s coefficient has a negative sign, with a significant 
value  of  -65  percent  in  the  case  of  Germany.  For  most  countries  bank  loans  determine  the 
magnitude of the overall impact of this channel, and in Finland they seem to dis-smooth income 
shocks by 55 percent. Saving is again the major source of insurance. The highest percentages of 
smoothing achieved through this channel are imputable to Finland (88 percent) and Sweden (85 
percent).  Saving  is  almost  completely  explained  by  government  saving  with  the  exclusion  of 
Sweden, where 59 percent out of 85 percent of insurance via saving is attributable to the private 
sector. It is worth noticing that Sweden results to be fully insured. 
 
          [insert table 5 here] 
 
From table 6 to table 9 detailed results for a few particular countries are presented. Table 6 refers to 
Ireland  where,  as  anticipated  above,  factor  income  smoothes  up  to  18  percent  of  shocks. 
Nevertheless, this value is mainly (but not totally) explained by the reaction to positive shocks.  
The case of Ireland is also quite interesting with respect to the impact of the financial account 
channel. We realize that although the overall impact is negative, its smoothing role with respect to 
negative shocks is relevant, especially in the case of bank loans (relying on the sign of the estimated 
coefficient). This is one of the very few cases in which external finance seems to play a positive 
role in smoothing consumption. 
In the case of Italy (table 7), it is striking to notice the impact of savings. Total saving is not 
statistically significant, but there we realize the importance of distinguishing among the nature of 
shocks. In fact, while private saving plays a robust consumption smoothing role, government saving 
shows a highly pro-cyclical (and therefore quite useless when the economy is in a slump) impact. It 
seems fair to say that, in the case of negative realizations of the shock variable, Italy has only been 
able to rely on international transfers, international bank loans and private saving. This might be 
due to budget and public debit difficulties which Italy has had to cope with since the early eighties 
and to budget restrictions later on imposed by the Maastricht treaty.   20 
 
          [insert tables 6 and 7 here] 
 
Table 8 presents the details for Sweden, where we observe a robust (positive) role for the financial 
account, and an equally robust, but negative, role for foreign income. In Table 9 the case of Greece 
is considered. Financial account (total) has a relevant dis-smoothing role in response to positive 
shocks (-62 percent when HP filter is considered, mainly due to bank loans) and a positive (but not 
significant) role with respect to negative shocks. Direct investments are significantly pro-cyclical in 
the face of positive realizations of the shock variable, while the opposite is true for bank loans. As 
for Italy, total saving is not statistically significant, nevertheless its subcomponents are significant 
when negative shocks are considered. Government saving smoothes up to 87 percent of income 
shocks, whereas private saving displays a dis-smoothing conduct. 
 
          [insert tables 8 and 9 here] 
 
Figures  1-4  plot  the  results  of  rolling  window  (10  years)  panel  regressions,  relative  to  factor 
income, the financial account (and its subcomponents) and savings. A cursory examination of those 
graphs will reveal that the relevance of such channels has not been stable over time, and that the 
impact of factor income and the financial account has been trending upwards. 
           
 
[insert figures 1 to 4 here] 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
The question of whether financial globalization has helped countries to insure consumption against 
adverse shocks is of the outmost relevance, as shown by the number and quality of contributions in 
the recent literature, especially in view of the crisis hitting the world economy in the last two years.  
The main research point of this work has been that of assessing the relative importance of various 
smoothing macro-channels, in the spirit of the pioneering contribution by Asdrubali et al. (1996). 
By  suitably  modifying  the  original  framework  in  different  directions,  so  as  to  account  for  a 
distinction among negative and positive shocks, and to include financial flows, we obtained some 
interesting insights as to the effective role of factor income flows and capital flows to and from 
abroad.  In  particular,  we  found  that  the  role  of  factor  income  has  been  limited,  but  generally 
increasing as financial globalization progressed through the last decade. On the other hand, capital 
flows have played a largely destabilizing role.   21 
A  time  series  analysis,  carried  out  country-wise,  has  provided  additional  and  quite  interesting 
insights into the specific behaviour of single countries with respect to the risk smoothing power of 
the various macro-channels.  
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Figure A2. Financial account to GDP ratio (1976-2007) 
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Table 1. Income and consumption smoothing (%) by National Accounts categories 1976-2007 







Linear and/or quadratic 
Trend 
  Tot  +  -  +  -  +  - 
               
Factor income  0  -1
  2  0  2  2  -3 
 
(2) 





































































Private  8  6  11


























Number of observations  403  403  338  403
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors reported in brackets 
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Table 6. Income and consumption smoothing (%)-1976-2007 
IRELAND 
  Factor 
income 
Capital 









Saving  Gov. 
Saving 
Private 
Saving  Unsmoothed  N. 
Obs. 
TOT  18
***  2  -3  -7  -37  1  29  31  20  11  58
***  31 
  (6)  (3)  (4)  (35)  (51)  (62)  (82)  (39)  (35)  (10)  (7)   
+  21
***  5  -2  -30  -89  -48  108  38  44  -6  68
***  31 
HP  (9)  (4)  (6)  (51)  (74)  (90)  (119)  (57)  (51)  (13)  (10)   
-  15  0  -3  14  11  47  -44  26  -2  27
**  48
***   
  (9)  (4)  (6)  (49)  (71)  (87)  (114)  (55)  (49)  (13)  (10)   
+  23
**  3  0  -34  -70  -27  63  48  49  -1  61
***  26 
BK  (10)  (4)  (6)  (58)  (73)  (74)  (95)  (64)  (57)  (16)  (11)   
-  14  -1  2  9  -8  19  -2  27  3  24  49
***   
  (10)  (3)  (5)  (55)  (69)  (70)  (91)  (60)  (54)  (15)  (11)   
+  21
***  4  -6  -3  -47  -14  58  20  13  7  64
***  31 
TR  (8)  (3)  (5)  (44)  (65)  (79)  (104)  (49)  (45)  (12)  (9)   
-  11  0  4  -13  -17  28  -24  52  32  19  47
***   
  (11)  (4)  (7)  (60)  (87)  (106)  (140)  (66)  (60)  (16)  (12)   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors reported in brackets 
If subcomponents of saving do not add up to the total value this is due to rounding 
 
Table 7. Income and consumption smoothing (%)-1976-2007 
ITALY 
  Factor 
income 
Capital 









Saving  Gov. 
Saving 
Private 
Saving  Unsmoothed  N. 
Obs. 
TOT  2  -3  2  -12  2  5  -20  33  11  22  79
***  31 
  (5)  (4)  (2)  (22)  (17)  (36)  (32)  (23)  (29)  (19)  (11)   
+  -1  3  1  -33  4  -16  -21  44  58  -15  87
***  31 
HP  (6)  (5)  (3)  (28)  (22)  (47)  (42)  (30)  (36)  (23)  (15)   
-  6  -12
*  2  17  0  34  -18  18  -56  74
***  69
***   
  (7)  (6)  (4)  (33)  (26)  (56)  (50)  (35)  (42)  (27)  (18)   
+  -5  3  -1  -45  19  -90  26  53  85
***  -33  95
***  26 
BK  (7)  (6)  (3)  31  (20)  (45)  (45)  (35)  (39)  (25)  (18)   
-  9  -6  8
**  33  23  95
*  -85  -6  -94
***  88
***  61
***   
  (8)  (7)  (3)  (37)  (24)  (54)  (55)  (42)  (47)  (30)  (22)   
+  -4  2  2  -15  10  8  -33  24  49  -25  91
***  31 
TR  (6)  (6)  (3)  (31)  (24)  (51)  (45)  (32)  (40)  (24)  (16)   
-  8  -8  1  -9  -5  2  -6  42  -27  68
***  67
***   
  (6)  (6)  (3)  (31)  (24)  (51)  (45)  (32)  (40)  (24)  (16)   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors reported in brackets 
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Table 8. Income and consumption smoothing (%)-1976-2007 
SWEDEN 
  Factor 
income 
Capital 









Saving  Gov. 
Saving 
Private 




*  0  25  26  37  -37  85
**  26  59
***  11  31 
  (6)  (3)  (2)  (33)  (62)  (48)  (41)  37  (38)  (18)  (11)   
+  -18  -9  5  41  98  -43  -14  51  7  45  31 
HP  (12)  (6)  (4)  (61)  (113)  (86)  (76)  (67)  (69)  (33)  (20) 
-  -8  -10
***  -2  18  -6  72  -48  100
**  35  66
***  2 
  (8)  (4)  (2)  (41)  (75)  (57)  (50)  (44)  (46)  (22)  (14) 
31 
 
+  -14  -8  6  40  106  -57  -9  43  10  32  33
***  26 
BK  (11)  (6)  (4)  (65)  (123)  (91)  (75)  (67)  (74)  (32)  (19)   
-  -20
*  -15
**  4  80  -18  160
*  -63  18  -12  31  32   
  (11)  (6)  (4)  (69)  (130)  (97)  (79)  (71)  (78)  (34)  (20)   
+  -21
*  -8  4  26  103  -54  -23  62  27  35  36
*  31 
TR  (12)  (6)  (4)  (62)  (114)  (87)  (77)  (68)  (70)  (33)  (21)   
-  -7  -10
**  -2  25  -6  74  -43  95
**  26  69
***  0   
  (8)  (4)  (3)  (40)  (74)  (56)  (50)  (44)  (45)  (21)  (13)   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors reported in brackets 
If subcomponents of saving do not add up to the total value this is due to rounding 
 
Table 9. Income and consumption smoothing (%)-1976-2007 
GREECE 
  Factor 
income 
Capital 









Saving  Gov. 
Saving 
Private 
Saving  Unsmoothed  N. 
Obs. 
TOT  6  -4
**  5
*  -16  -6  -11  1  20  29  -9  89
***  31 
  (5)  (2)  (3)  (22)  (9)  (32)  (19)  (22)  (25)  (15)  (9)   
+  6  -4
*  2  20  -23
**  36  7  -1  -16  15  77
***  31 
HP  (6)  (3)  (4)  (28)  (11)  (41)  (26)  (29)  (31)  (19)  (12)   
-  5  -3
*  8  -62
*  18  -71  -8  47  87
**  -40
*  105
***   
  (7)  (3)  (4)  (32)  (13)  (47)  (30)  (33)  (35)  (22)  (14)   
+  9  -5  2  7  -24
**  24  7  12  -5  17  76
***  26 
BK  (7)  (3)  (4)  (33)  (11)  (43)  (19)  (34)  (37)  (22)  (14)   
-  0  -3  6  -29  8  -30  -8  26  57  -31  101
***   
  (7)  (3)  (4)  (35)  (12)  (45)  (20)  (36)  (39)  (23)  (14)   
+  9  -5
**  3  3  -15  8  10  7  -4  11  83
***  31 
TR  (6)  (2)  (4)  (29)  (12)  (42)  (25)  (29)  (31)  (19)  (12)   
-  1  -1  7  -41  8  -37  -12  38  74
**  -36  97
***   
  (7)  (3)  (4)  (34)  (14)  (49)  (30)  (34)  (37)  (23)  (14)   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors reported in brackets 
If subcomponents of saving do not add up to the total value this is due to rounding 
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